lp:~ubuntu-virt/libvirt/+git/libvirt-lp-import

Author: Peter Krempa
Author Date: 2023-08-17 13:36:51 UTC

conf: Rename 'nodeformat' field of virStorageSource to 'nodenameformat'

While the name itself doesn't matter, this rename is done to prove that
all places using 'nodeformat' were converted to the appropriate
accessors.

Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:16:14 UTC

api: disallow virConnectGetDomainCapabilities on read-only connections

This API can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid it on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10167
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8afa68bac0cf99d1f8aaa6566685c43c22622f26)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Ján Tomko
Author Date: 2019-06-14 07:17:39 UTC

api: disallow virConnect*HypervisorCPU on read-only connections

These APIs can be used to execute arbitrary emulators.
Forbid them on read-only connections.

Fixes: CVE-2019-10168
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6c2830b6c338b1f5699b095df36f374777b291)
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Daniel Berrange
Author Date: 2019-03-13 16:21:15 UTC

network: avoid trying to create global firewall rules if unprivileged

The unprivileged libvirtd does not have permission to create firewall
rules, or bridge devices, or do anything to the host network in
general. Historically we still activate the network driver though and
let the network start API call fail.

The startup code path which reloads firewall rules on active networks
would thus effectively be a no-op when unprivileged as it is impossible
for there to be any active networks

With the change to use a global set of firewall chains, however, we now
have code that is run unconditionally.

Ideally we would not register the network driver at all when
unprivileged, but the entanglement with the virt drivers currently makes
that impractical. As a temporary hack, we just make the firewall reload
into a no-op.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5d010c3df6152cf5fb00f1f67d22151241f4a8a2)

Author: Cole Robinson
Author Date: 2016-07-18 22:35:23 UTC

Prep for release 1.2.18.4

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Yang Hongyang
Author Date: 2016-06-25 03:53:49 UTC

lxc_container: remove extra bool from lxcBasicMounts initialization

Seems a backport miss. An extra member is passed to struct
virLXCBasicMountInfo.

Signed-off-by: Yang hongyang <hongyang.yang@easystack.cn>

Commit bda5f2b (a backport of commit 2471041) listed one more value
than the virLXCBasicMountInfo has here, because v1.2.9-maint does
not have the skipNoNetns bool (introduced by commit ba9b725 released
in 1.2.11).

Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <jtomko@redhat.com>

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)
(cherry picked from commit 139a4265774b7aa194f8479a82188bc1337cd7a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)
(cherry picked from commit 139a4265774b7aa194f8479a82188bc1337cd7a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)
(cherry picked from commit d933f68ee660566b52cd90330aee0d5f414636a4)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Jiri Denemark
Author Date: 2016-06-28 12:39:58 UTC

qemu: Let empty default VNC password work as documented

CVE-2016-5008

Setting an empty graphics password is documented as a way to disable
VNC/SPICE access, but QEMU does not always behaves like that. VNC would
happily accept the empty password. Let's enforce the behavior by setting
password expiration to "now".

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1180092

Signed-off-by: Jiri Denemark <jdenemar@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb848feec0f3f10e92dd8e5231ae7aa89b5598f3)

Author: Eric Blake
Author Date: 2014-09-18 15:29:07 UTC

maint: this branch is now dead

Upstream is no longer willing to backport patches to a branch
this old. If you disagree with the policy, please volunteer
to become the branch maintainer on libvir-list@redhat.com

Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>

Author: Eric Blake
Author Date: 2014-01-22 18:57:37 UTC

maint: this branch is now dead

Upstream is no longer willing to backport patches to a branch
this old. If you disagree with the policy, please volunteer
to become the branch maintainer on libvir-list@redhat.com

Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>

Author: Eric Blake
Author Date: 2014-01-22 18:57:37 UTC

maint: this branch is now dead

Upstream is no longer willing to backport patches to a branch
this old. If you disagree with the policy, please volunteer
to become the branch maintainer on libvir-list@redhat.com

Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>