lp://staging/ubuntu/lucid-updates/ecryptfs-utils
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- 68. By Tyler Hicks
-
* SECURITY UPDATE: Mount passphrase wrapped with a default salt value
- src/libecryptfs/key_management .c, src/include/ ecryptfs. h: Generate a
random salt when wrapping the mount passphrase.
- src/pam_ecryptfs/ pam_ecryptfs. c: If a user has a mount passphrase that was
wrapped using the default salt, their mount passphrase will be rewrapped
using a random salt when they log in with their password.
- src/libecryptfs/key_management .c: Create a temporary file when creating
a new wrapped-passphrase file and copy it to its final destination after
the file has been fully synced to disk (LP: #1020902)
- CVE-2014-9687 - 67. By Marc Deslauriers
-
* SECURITY UPDATE: wrong mtab ownership and permissions (LP: #830850)
- src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_ private. c: also set gid and umask before
updating mtab.
- CVE-2011-3145 - 66. By Marc Deslauriers
-
* SECURITY UPDATE: privilege escalation via mountpoint race conditions
(LP: #732628)
- src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_ private. c: chdir into mountpoint before
checking permissions. Patch thanks to Dan Rosenberg.
- CVE-2011-1831
- CVE-2011-1832
* SECURITY UPDATE: race condition when checking source during mount
(LP: #732628)
- src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_ private. c: use new ecryptfs_ check_dev_ ruid
kernel option when mounting directory.
- CVE-2011-1833
* SECURITY UPDATE: mtab corruption via improper handling (LP: #732628)
- src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_ private. c: modify mtab via a temp file first
and make sure it succeeds before replacing the real mtab. Patch
thanks to Dan Rosenberg.
- CVE-2011-1834
* SECURITY UPDATE: key poisoning via insecure temp directory handling
(LP: #732628)
- src/utils/ecryptfs- setup-private: make sure we don't copy into a
user controlled directory.
- CVE-2011-1835
* SECURITY UPDATE: arbitrary file overwrite via lock counter race
condition (LP: #732628)
- src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_ private. c: verify permissions with a file
descriptor, and don't follow symlinks.
- CVE-2011-1837 - 64. By Dustin Kirkland
-
debian/rules, debian/control: disable the gpg key module,
as it's not yet functional; does more harm than good to build it;
should not be in 10.04 LTS; clean up build-deps; also, not using
opencryptoki either; unbreak the build for 32-bit Lucid - 63. By Dustin Kirkland
-
[ David Planella ]
* Makefile.am, configure.ac, debian/control, debian/po/POTFILES. sh,
debian/po/ecryptfs- utils.pot, debian/po/fr.po, debian/rules,
po/POTFILES.in, src/desktop/Makefile. am,
src/desktop/ecryptfs- mount-private. desktop,
src/desktop/ecryptfs- mount-private. desktop. in,
src/desktop/ecryptfs- record- passphrase,
src/desktop/ecryptfs- setup-private. desktop,
src/desktop/ecryptfs- setup-private. desktop. in:
- internationalization work for LP: #358283
* po/LINGUAS, po/ca.po: Catalan translation[ Yan Li <email address hidden> ]
* src/pam_ecryptfs/ pam_ecryptfs. c, src/utils/ Makefile. am,
src/utils/ecryptfs- migrate- home: add a script and pam hooks to
support automatic migration to encrypted home directory[ Dustin Kirkland ]
* src/utils/ecryptfs- migrate- home: clean up for merge
- use $() rather than ``
- drop set -u
- use = and !=, and quote vars, rather than testing with -ne, -eq,
for better shell portability
- improve usage statement and error text
- check if already encrypted
- handle migration of multiple users on boot
- fix all whitespace, use tabs for indents
- use quotes around variables, rather than ${} (stylistic preference)
- major simplification for immediate release
+ remove boot and user modes; only support administrator mode for
security reasons and to avoid race conditions
+ other modes can be re-added, if necessary, and if security
concerns can be addressed
- ensure running as root
- drop VERBOSE option, always print useful info messages
- call the user $USER_NAME rather than $USER_ID since id implies
number, and here we're deailing with names
- no decimals on awk calculation
- mktemp on the target user, not root
- check that there is enough disk space available to do the migration
- ensure the user's homedir group is correct
- add critical instructions, user *must* login after the migration and
before the reboot, as their wrapped passphrase will be cleared on
reboot (possible we should use an init script to move these to
/var/tmp on reboot)
- ensure permissions are set correctly
- improve text at the end of the migration, organize into notes
* ecryptfs-utils.ecryptfs- utils-restore. upstart,
ecryptfs-utils.ecryptfs- utils-save. upstart, rules:
- try to protect migrating users who don't login before the next reboot
* debian/ecryptfs- utils.install: install the locale messages
* src/desktop/ecryptfs- record- passphrase: improve dialog text
* src/desktop/ecryptfs- record- passphrase: revert the _ bit, as it's not quite
working yet, will need to talk to David to fix
* Mark LP: #471725 as fixed - 60. By Dustin Kirkland
-
* src/utils/
ecryptfs- setup-private, debian/control: LP: #456565
- fix typo, s/getext/gettext
- depend on gettext-base - 59. By Dustin Kirkland
-
src/utils/
ecryptfs- setup-private: fix bug where setup-private
incorrectly assumed that the home/private dir ownerships should
be owned by USER:USER; instead, default to USER:GROUP, where
GROUP is the USER's primary group by default, cherry-pick upstream
r463, LP: #445301
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- Stacked on:
- lp://staging/ubuntu/natty/ecryptfs-utils